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Guest Editorial ... 
Ethical Issues in Community and 
Research Medicine 
The following guest editorial by 
Saltonstall Professor of Population 
Ethics, Arthur J. Dyck, is reprinted 
from the New England Journal of 
Medicine. In it reference is made to an 
article, "Ethics of a Cottage Industry 
in an Age of Community and Research 
Medicine, " by Paul Ramsey, professor 
of Christian Ethics at Princeton. Pro-
fessor Ramsey's article appeared in the 
same issue, April 1, 1971, of the New 
England Journal of Medicine, pages 
700-706. 
R eprinted with permission from the 
New England Journal of Medicine. 
Arthur J. Dyck is Salton stall Profes-
sor of PopUlation Ethics at Harvard 
School of Public Health and a faculty 




Arthur J. Oyck 
Ramsey's essay in this issue of the 
Journal identifies two broad areas in 
which serious ethical issues arise for 
the practice of medicine - namely, 
community medicine and medical re-
search. His excellent discussion of 
these issues suggests that when medi-
cine attempts to make judgments 
about social well-being and when its 
practitioners become increasingly dedi-
cated to the advancement of science, 
important questions must be raised 
regarding the role , warrant and 
principles of medical practice. What 
tasks and what judgments accrue to 
physicians as physicians? What are 
they trained to do and what ought 
they to be trained to do? By what 
primary principles and modes of ethi-
cal reasoning is and ought their prac-
tice to be governed? Let us briefly 
examine a specific instance in which 
current medical practice is involved 
sometimes implicitly , sometimes ex-
plicitly, in conflicting ways of 
answering these questions. 
In a recent series of articles in the 
Journal, Milunsky et aLl review the 
curren t state of prenatal genetic diag-
nosis and argue for the widespread use 
of amniocentesis. As they use the 
term, amniocentesis refers to the aspir-
ation of fluid from the amniotic sac 
for the purpose of making cytogenetic 
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studies. The immediate rationale for 
this use of amniocentesis is to advance 
the practice of genetic counseling by 
basing predictions of an increasing 
number of diseases upon actual diag-
noses in utero instead of ca lculated 
probauility risKs. The advantages that 
they cite for this more accurate coun-
sel is that it reassures couples regarding 
the nonnality of the fetus , it permits 
the decision to intervene thro ugh abor-
tion where abnonnalities are detected, 
and it provides a way of preventing the 
births of infants with irreparable gen-
etic defects and fatal genetic diseases. 
Milunsky and his co-workers recognize 
tha t this last use of amniocentesis 
changes the traditional role of the 
physician so far as he can now predict 
diseases accurately before birth and 
provide the means of preventing the 
birth of a child with mental defects or 
fatal diseases. Hence , we enter a new 
era of social and preventive medicine. 
Throughout the discussion of the 
diagnostic use of amniocentesis as ad-
vocated by Milunsky et a!., there is no 
explicit recognition of the fetus as a 
patient. Apparently, genetic coun-
eling does not include the task of 
preparing a family to accept and care 
for a defect ive child. "Therapy" at the 
present t ime is aimed at the family and 
not the fetus . I n an earlier essay, John 
W. Littlefield spoke specifically to this 
issue: 
Prena tal genetic diagnosis will con-
st itute a major medical advance only if 
therapy can be given once a diagnosis is 
made. Eventually and occasionally, this 
may be prenatal tberapy for the fetus . .. 
But society and the professions mllst 
appreciate and accept that the proper 
th erapy now is for the family. and at 
times that means abortion. 2 
Clea rly , neither reassurance for the 
family nor abo rtion provides therapy 
for the fetus . The hope is held ou t for 
eventua l and occasional therapy for 
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the fetus, with no explicit reference to 
the kinds of postnatal therapy pres-
ent ly available. For now, the treat-
ment of the diseases of this "sometime 
patient" is, in this view, achieved by 
its elimination as a patien t and as a 
hving entity. 
Suppose a physician argues that 
deciding whether to treat the fetus as a 
patient is a judgment that a physician 
as physician is not in a position to 
make. In effect, this is the view taken 
by Milunsky et a!. when they suggest 
that physicians and society are, and 
should remain, impartial or neutral 
regarding decisions by fami lies about 
whether to use amniocentesis and 
whether to abort the fetus where 
deformities are detected. This point of 
view is strange considering both the 
traditional ro le of physicians and cu r-
rent medical practice. 
As the physicians' role was tradi-
tionally depicted in the Hippocratic 
Oath and many subsequent codes, he 
was expected to be the physician 
advocate of both the pregnant woman 
and developing life within the womb. 
If, as Milunsky et al. suggest, both 
physician and society should be impar-
tial regarding the use of amnioce ntesis 
to prevent diseases by elimin at ing the 
di seased, what advocate is left for 
defenseless life? Are physicians about 
to abandon also their time-honored 
role as advocates on behalf of the 
hopelessly ill , the unconsc ious and the 
experimental subject who is unin-
formed? And even if one wishes to 
leave the exact status of the fet us as a 
human life an open question , sho uld it 
not be part of the specia l responsi-
bility of the physician, as it certainly 
has been traditionally , to err on the 
side of saving and fostering human life 
rather than to develop or encourage 
programs that se lectively prevent such 
life? 
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To drop the fetus as a patient at 
this time in history is also incongruous 
with the aims and increasing accom-
plishments of contemporary fetology. 
Furthermore, why should physicians 
claim increasing responsibility for de-
fining and specifying the end of 
human life, and decreasing responsi-
bility for defining and specifying the 
beginning of human life? Why, for 
example, should the absence of signs 
of brain activity spell death wh ile signs 
of brain activity in the eight-week-old 
fetus are largely unheralded as signs of 
human life? If physicians nevertheless 
insist that specifying when human life 
begins is not a medical decision, by 
what warrant do they decide that the 
fetus is not a patient and that his life is 
dispensable? As Ramsey has indicated, 
the medical warrant for recommending 
abortion occurs only when a fetus 
threatens the life or the health of a 
pregnant woman. 
To decide that a given set of 
diseases is to be eliminated by 
elimination of the diseased is one of 
the principles on wh ich programs of 
eugenics and eu thanasia rest. Decisions 
of this kind are surely not morally 
neu tral. What special competence does 
a physician have to decidc that a 
society ought to prefer death to giving 
custodial or remedial care for those 
who require it? Milunsky et al. cite the 
costs of care for the mentally retarded 
in Massachusetts. What a meager sum 
this is as compared to the amount of 
money being spent for destroying lives 
in Vietnam! If saving money is im-
portan t, why not save much more 
money and save lives as well by 
thinking of other costs that could be 
cut? One of the problems here is that, 
as the physicians strive to contribute 
to social well-being, they find that 
only certain kinds of actions are pre-
dictably within their power as physi-
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cians. Hence, they look to the surest 
way in which they can affect social 
policy. Their warrant for doing so is 
very unclear, and, whereas we can vote 
out those who might suggest legisla-
tion that permits or encourages selec-
tive killing, including capital punish-
ment and the like, our recourse in 
forming the conscience of physicians is 
less certain. Heretofore, in the area of 
abortion , we have generally pu t con-
straints upon physicians and others on 
behalf of the fetus. The assumption 
that the use and application of 
amn iocentesis is a neutral sphere for 
physicians and society presupposes 
tha t, for physicians and society, 
abortion is not a moral issue , and that 
existing or fu ture laws do or will 
assure that abortions are decided 
solely by families and physicians. To 
go that way is not morally neutral , and 
it is not life affirming. 
Like so many technical innovations, 
amniocentesis is a powerful tool in 
search of a noble purpose. On the 
whole, medicine has exhibited a re-
markable degree of compassion for the 
ill whatever their condition, agressive 
zest in affirming, extending and en-
hancing life, and loyalty to the welfare 
of individual patients whatevcr their 
presumable social utility. The use of 
amniocentesis is surely to be judged by 
these principles, for if it is not , it 
threatens to erode them. 
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